Assassination, insurrection and alien invasion: interwar wireless scares in cross-national comparison by Lacey, Kate
C H A P T E R  T H R E E  
Assassination, Insurrection 
and Alien Invasion:  
Interwar Wireless Scares in 
Cross-National Comparison 
KATE LACEY 
In this chapter, Lacey argues that the War of the Worlds broadcast 
was not the first “radio scare” of its kind, but followed in the 
footsteps of a 1926 British production, Broadcasting from the 
Barricades, and a 1930 German radio broadcast, Der Minister ist 
ermordet! (The Minister’s Been Murdered!). Drawing on newspaper 
reports from Germany, as well as the UK and US, Lacey shows how 
public discourse surrounding these fictional broadcasts referred 
back to the ones before, even across national borders. She 
contends that some audience members perceived the dramas as real 
because a) they played convincingly with the developing 
conventions of live news reporting; and b) they drew on a 
prevailing climate of fear (social, economic, and political) to 
enhance the believability of their fictional crisis reports. 
Introduction 
he Berlin audience tuning into the radio one late September 
evening in 1930 heard the station break into an orchestral 
recital with the following announcement: 
Achtung! Achtung! This is Berlin and Königs Wusterhausen. The 
T 
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German Foreign Minister returning from the Geneva Conference has been 
murdered on his arrival at the Friedrichstrasse railway station in Berlin. 
There will now therefore be a change to this evening’s programs. 
(Reichsrundfunkgesellschaft (RRG), Berliner Börsen-Zeitung, Sept. 26, 1930)1  
The Weimar Republic was at the time riven by political extremism 
and uncertainty and the assassination of a leading member of the 
Government promised to hurl the infant democracy into still deeper 
crisis.  
Except it never happened. This was simply the controversial twist 
to a radio play broadcast by the Berlin radio station on September 25, 
1930. But with its make-believe newsflash and as-live reporting of a 
subsequent putsch, the broadcast unleashed fear among listeners that 
they were witnessing the unfolding of a right-wing coup in the streets 
of the capital. This was no idle threat against the backdrop of increas-
ing militancy in the country, and countless listeners bombarded the 
station, the authorities and the press with requests for more infor-
mation. There were even reports of some disquiet abroad (“’Contre-
temps,’” 1930, p. 9). 
As a wireless scare, Erich Ebermayer’s Der Minister ist ermordet! 
(The Minister’s Been Murdered!) had some obvious similarities to the 
War of the Worlds broadcast some eight years later, as did an even ear-
lier example of a broadcast in the UK that also used the nascent codes 
of news reporting to describe an escalating riot and the lynching of a 
government minister. Broadcasting from the Barricades was a twenty-
minute satirical skit broadcast in January 1926 by the British Broad-
casting Company, the precursor of the British Broadcasting Corpora-
tion.2 Against the background of rising tensions that were to lead to 
the General Strike, this obviously fictional report nevertheless  
similarly caused a degree of fear and consternation among some 
of its listeners. Neither of these two earlier wireless scares resonates in 
the popular memory in the same way as the War of the Worlds, nor 
have they attracted anything like the same degree of scholarly atten-
tion.3 This chapter examines the reasons for the different trajectories 
of these broadcast events, as well as what they have in common as 
media events in times of crisis. The story of these earlier wireless 
scares draws attention to the way in which these media events—all 
inspired by fictional news reporting and in some way tapping into an 
already existing climate of fear—exhibit many common traits while at 
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the same time highlighting how such events played out in different 
ways in specific national and political contexts. Moreover, within that 
story, there emerges a degree of cross-reference in the international 
press coverage of these successive events that says something about 
their gradual mythologization, not to mention the caricaturing of gul-
lible foreign audiences according to national stereotypes. 
Drawing primarily on archival and newspaper sources, this chap-
ter explores the controversy surrounding the broadcast of a play in 
the fractious political climate of Weimar Germany and how the fall-
out from that broadcast then fed into the increasingly polarized ap-
proaches to radio policy. The chapter also sets the broadcast in the 
context of experimentalism in German radio drama and the interplay 
with other forms of newly invented broadcast genres that exploited 
radio’s liveness. It shows how the right-wing nationalists exploited 
the scandal to rein in the more progressive elements of Weimar radio, 
while future propagandists learned an important lesson about the 
power of the radio to influence and deceive the listening public. The 
earlier British play, meanwhile, was a self-referential parody of the 
emerging genre of broadcast news that highlighted the extent to 
which both broadcasters and listeners were still honing their craft just 
a couple of short years after public broadcasting began.  
In examining the public reaction to these plays, this chapter re-
veals how debates about the (ir)responsibility of broadcasters and the 
(in)vulnerability of audiences—so familiar to scholars of the War of the 
Worlds event—were inflected in a European context of public service 
broadcasting and against a background of class division and street 
politics. In so doing, it highlights the parallels and differences be-
tween these earlier broadcasts and the more famous American radio 
scare of 1938, and so contributes a cross-national perspective that is so 
often missing in broadcasting histories.  
Radio in the Weimar Republic 
The Weimar Republic (1918–1933) was established in the aftermath of 
Germany’s defeat in the First World War, a defeat that had plunged 
the country into a period of economic, political and social turmoil. 
The liberal Weimar Constitution was set against a background of 
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political fragmentation and burgeoning extremism on left and right, 
fuelled by post-war recriminations and mistrust. The economy, 
already in crisis due to the War and demobilization, was further 
stung by the punitive reparations imposed by the victors at Versailles. 
When Germany failed to keep up its payments, the French occupied 
the Ruhr region, exacerbating the sense of crisis. The government’s 
response of printing money only fed a spiralling inflation that 
reached its height in the autumn of 1923, producing iconic images of 
people wheeling barrows of worthless paper money through the 
streets. The general atmosphere of chaos and abandon was reflected 
in new social and cultural practices that gave rise in almost equal 
measure either to declarations of moral panic or celebrations of the 
potential for radical renewal. Following the hyperinflation, currency 
reform, the injection of American money, and a program of 
rationalization ushered in a period of relative stability—only to come 
to an abrupt end with the Wall St. Crash of 1929. The privations of the 
Depression in Germany were harsh, and provided a fertile context for 
the political extremism that, by the start of 1933, led the National 
Socialists to power. In short, the Weimar Republic reeled from one 
catastrophe to another, and on many different levels was marked by a 
general sense of instability, transience and crisis.  
It was into this febrile mix that public radio entered in November 
1923—at the height of the Great Inflation, and against a background 
of separatist extremism, such as Hitler’s failed Beerhall Putsch earlier 
that month in Munich. Thousands of men returning from the war had 
been trained in radio technology, and the spectre of radio as an inter-
active communications technology in the hands of either the extreme 
left or right haunted the mainstream political imagination. Although 
the 1918 Constitution explicitly guaranteed freedom of speech and 
prohibited censorship, radio was never considered for such freedoms: 
its potential as a medium for political influence and agitation was all 
too evident to the authorities.  
In this context, German radio came to be established as a closely 
regulated network of regional state-owned stations broadcasting pre-
approved programs produced by companies funded in part by pri-
vate capital, but closely controlled by local and national government, 
and aimed at licensed listeners (Lerg, 1970, p. 373). The key pro-
gramming policy developed under the head of German radio, Hans 
Bredow, was to keep politics off the air altogether. To this end, broad-
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casts were screened ahead of transmission by politically appointed 
censorship bodies and local cultural advisory boards. As a result, 
most output tended to be rather bland, running scared of both con-
troversy and innovation, and reducing this brand new medium of 
communication to a channel for recycling established cultural forms.  
There were, however, notable exceptions to this ”defensive mod-
ernization” (Führer, 1996, p. 777), particularly where there were vi-
sionary directors who wanted to develop new ”radiogenic” art forms, 
and who were tuned in to the broader culture of experimentation and 
daring characterizing so much of Weimar film, theatre, literature, mu-
sic, cabaret and criticism. One such visionary was Hans Flesch (1896–
1945), the first artistic director of the radio station in Frankfurt. Flesch 
quickly built up a reputation for sponsoring avant garde artists on the 
air—during his career he commissioned, among others, Paul Hinde-
mith, Arnold Schönberg, Bertolt Brecht, Kurt Weill, Walter Benjamin, 
Walter Ruttmann and Alfred Döblin. By 1929, he had been poached 
by Hans Bredow to head the Berliner Funk-Stunde in order to rescue 
the waning artistic reputation of the country’s largest and most im-
portant station (Leonhard, 1997, pp. 81–85; Weil, 1996). The broadcast 
of Der Minister ist ermordet! just a few months into his tenure was to 
prove a great test for Flesch’s commitment to innovative and provoca-
tive broadcasting. 
On October 24 1924, just seven months after the very first broad-
cast in Frankfurt, Flesch had produced his now famous ”study for a 
broadcast grotesque,” Zauberei auf dem Sender (Magic on the Radio). 
This was the first bespoke radio play ever broadcast in Germany. 
Magic on the Radio was set in the radio station itself and, rather like 
War of the Worlds some fourteen years later, offered a critical self-
reflection on the world of broadcasting and the conventions it was 
beginning to establish (Gilfillan, 2009, p. xxi). Flesch wanted to exploit 
the new technical and artistic potential that the radio offered, not least 
its liveness, its distant and dispersed audience, and its disembodied 
voice. An extraordinarily imaginative production, it had its charac-
ters—a magician and a fairy-tale teller—interrupting the apparently 
bona fide announcer, and incorporated as sound effects the kind of 
white noise and other interference that was so common a part of the 
listener experience in the early 1920s. In this way it was an early 
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demonstration of radio art as acoustic montage, as the art of the ma-
chine, as construction and not just reproduction. It was also a satirical 
and playful exploration of radio as illusion, magic, simulation, decep-
tion (Hagen, 1999). In so doing it put center stage the question of ra-
dio’s trustworthiness; the same question that would be at the heart of 
the wireless scares to come. The placelessness, the invisibility, the 
transitoriness of radio, all raised questions about how the audience 
was expected to listen in good faith, trusting in radio’s illusion of the 
real, its construction of authority.  
If it was the job of the new radio art to question and probe the re-
alist and reproductive aesthetic that was already dominating the 
schedules, it was, for Flesch, the job of radio more generally to bring 
news of public life instantaneously, directly and vividly to the ears of 
the listening public—a job that was foiled by both technical and polit-
ical constraints. Flesch realized that if the Grunewald went up in 
flames, or civil war broke out—or if a Minster was assassinated in the 
street—the radio could not report it live (Hagen, 1999). In fact, just a 
month before his arrival in Berlin, there had been several days of vio-
lent confrontation between Communist protesters and the Prussian 
police following the banned May Day demonstrations, that had left 
some thirty civilians dead and over a thousand taken into custody. 
The radio had been so reticent to cover the events—the press relished 
reporting—that a young man who had been listening to his radio 
walked, unsuspecting, into the street and was hit by a bullet (Weil, 
1996, p. 240). The events of Blutmai (Bloody May) certainly height-
ened the divisions not only between left and right, but between the 
Communist Party and the governing Social Democrats. Indeed there 
was a marked rise in support for the National Socialists as a radical 
alternative after Blutmai—exacerbated by the onset of the Depres-
sion—even in staunchly Marxist areas of the capital, like ”Red” Wed-
ding (Bowlby, 1986).  
There was general acclamation for Flesch’s appointment in the 
liberal and leftwing press, which hoped he might be able to make 
some progress in refreshing the stale and unadventurous schedules of 
the Funk-Stunde. The right-wing Deutsche Zeitung however, warned 
its readers to expect him to undertake the same ”bolshevist dictator-
ship” as he had practiced in Frankfurt where listeners had been 
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”pained by the horrors of the so-called ”new art” (RRG, Deutsche 
Zeitung, Apr. 30, 1929). In one interview, Flesch explained that his 
central watchword would be ”tolerance.” His aim was to bring ”con-
tradictory and antithetical opinions to the microphone,” and hoped it 
would be reciprocated by ”the same degree of tolerance among our 
listeners.” The radio could be a salve for the political intolerance dis-
figuring German public life, if it could teach people to listen to one 
another again (Funk, Mar., 1930, cited in Jelavich, 2009, p. 60). It was 
to prove a vain hope, and the wireless scare of 1930 was just one indi-
cation of how the radio simply became another battlefield on which 
the opposing forces faced each other down.  
On his arrival in Berlin in June 1929, Flesch was charged with re-
newing the ”dilettantish” phase of radio with a new professionalism. 
One of his priorities was to encourage live journalism, by charging 
journalists to ”sniff out” stories for immediate transmission. He had 
already been responsible for other journalistic innovations at Frank-
furt, for example the live radio reporting pioneered in a series called 
Disorientated Microphone by Paul Hindemith (to whom he was related 
by marriage) and the celebrated reporter, Paul Laven. For the first 
time, listeners heard live soundscapes of the city and interviews with 
”ordinary” people talking about their everyday lives and problems 
(Laven, 1975, p.17; Schivelbusch, 1982, p. 65). And it had been under 
Flesch’s direction in 1927 that Germany’s first series of explicitly polit-
icized talks was aired. Gedanken zur Zeit (Thoughts on the Times) al-
lowed speakers with different points of view to take to the 
microphone in turns, ”unhindered and unscripted” (Heitger, 1998, 
pp. 218–219). In Berlin he wanted to bring microphones into parlia-
ment, the courts, and connect public halls by cable to the studios to 
bring the radio right into the heart of public life; but he was foiled by 
the prevailing strictures on political content (Flesch, 1930). However, 
he got around the restrictions to a certain extent with a monthly Ret-
rospective made up of recorded speeches and public events (“Die 
akustische,” 1930, pp. 7–8; Heitger, 1998, pp. 409–410).  
Flesch’s reforms were not restricted to journalistic coverage. He 
declared that the radio’s content was life in all its guises (Weil, 1996, 
p. 226). One of his most celebrated commissions was Walter 
Ruttman’s now iconic imageless ”sound film” of Berlin, Weekend. He 
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also set up the world’s first studio dedicated to ”new music” and ra-
dio experimentation. Another innovation was a new department for 
the ”artistic word,” with Edlef Köppen as its head. It was here where 
the decision to broadcast Ebermayer’s play was taken, with Max Bing, 
one of the in-house directors, appointed to direct under the watchful 
eye of Alfred Braun, then head of drama and radio plays (Leonhard, 
1997, p. 292). Braun was a familiar voice to listeners as he’d been the 
station announcer in Berlin from the beginning (his famous ”Ach-
tung! Achtung! Hier ist Berlin!” was the blueprint for the play’s own 
newsflash), as well as reporter, scriptwriter and director. He was also 
another leading light of experimental radio, and advocate of the 
”acoustic film,” works that garnered both extravagant praise and vir-
ulent criticism from different quarters of the polarized press.  
At first, the press had largely been behind Flesch’s reforms, but by 
mid-1930 there was again talk of a ”storm of dissatisfaction” swirling 
around the Berlin wavelength (RRG, Berliner Lokalanzeiger, Apr. 13, 
1930), and more frequent attacks by the right-wing about the ”class-
war propaganda” and ”radio monopoly” propagated by the Funk-
Stunde (RRG, Berliner Westen, Mar. 27, 1930). It was in opposition to 
the perceived ”red domain” of the Berlin radio that a new listeners’ 
organization was established, the Reichsverband Deutscher Rund-
funkhörer (National Union of German Radio Listeners), with the aim 
of mobilizing a ”resistance” made up of ”bourgeois, Christian and na-
tionalist” listeners (Koch & Glaser, 2007, pp. 101–102; Ortsgruppen, 
1931, p. 5).4 The Union quickly grew and, in time, would provide 
many of the leading figures of the Nazi radio system. Indeed, the or-
ganization of listeners was increasingly politicized on both sides 
(Lacey, 2005). The worker’s radio movement was well established in 
Germany and, earlier in the month in Prague, delegates from across 
Europe had agreed to establish a Workers’ Radio International (RRG, 
Leipziger Volkszeitung, Oct.10, 1930). 
Dramatic License and Dramatic Censorship 
By 1930, Erich Ebermayer (1900–1970) was becoming an established 
writer of expressionist novellas and dramas, and was moving in the 
artistic and bohemian circles in Munich, counting Klaus Mann and 
♒  LACEY ♒ 
 
 
65 
Ernst Toller among his friends. He had already had one play 
broadcast, the story of Kaspar Hauser, an adaptation of his first 
theatrical success in Hamburg (which had starred the young Gustav 
Gründgens). He was also appearing regularly on the airwaves 
throughout Germany, reading from his novellas and poems 
(“Schriftsteller,” 1924–32). 
Yet despite Ebermayer’s growing reputation, The Minister’s Been 
Murdered! did not get on to the air without a struggle—indeed, there 
was almost as much controversy in advance of its airing as in its 
wake. The two-hour drama was loosely based on events eight years 
previously, when the then Foreign Minister, Walter Rathenau, had 
been assassinated by right-wing extremists, shortly after signing the 
Treaty of Rapallo with the Soviet Union. Ebermayer’s father had been 
a lawyer for the prosecution in the trial of Rathenau’s assassins, and 
Ebermayer had written the play hoping it might draw attention to the 
senselessness of the extreme right-wing’s political murders. In Janu-
ary 1930, Ebermayer sent the script to the regional radio station Mirag 
(Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk AG), based in Leipzig, where the new sta-
tion director, Ludwig Neubeck, had ambitions to refresh the literary 
output of the station (Leonhard, 1997, p. 293). At first it seems it was 
warmly received, but by mid-February 1930, the Mirag management, 
recognizing the potential sensitivity of the plot, had got cold feet and 
called Ebermayer before the censors (Direktion Mirag, 1930, p. 17). 
The play was rejected on both cultural and political grounds, to be 
neither broadcast from Leipzig, nor relayed from any other station 
that might accept it. One of the arguments that swung the decision 
was that Ebermayer had published ”unfounded” claims about politi-
cal interference at the station in the 8 Uhr-Abendblatt three days earlier 
on March 14, namely that the scheduled broadcast had been stalled 
by objections raised by Dr. Ziegler, a Nazi party member on the board 
of censorship. Although the meeting rejected Ebermayer’s version of 
events, it decided not to demand a retraction (Miraghaus, 1930).  
Ebermayer’s article had been published under the unambiguous 
headline, “Radio Censorship at Mirag: Thuringian Nazi prevents the 
broadcast of a play.” It argued that the treatment of his play was po-
litically partisan and marked a new low in the intellectual bullying of 
the broadcasters and the responsible authorities (RRG, 8 Uhr 
Tageblatt, Mar. 14, 1930; 8 Uhr-Abendblatt, Oct. 3, 1930). Ebermayer 
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maintained that within two days of his submitting the manuscript, 
the head of the literary department, Dr. Eugen Kurt Fischer, had ex-
pressed his delight at receiving such a well-achieved piece of work 
and that he would press for it to be broadcast, subject to only minor 
changes. In a second meeting, according to Ebermayer, the details of 
the direction, the casting and the contract had all been settled for a 
first broadcast to go ahead on March 28 at 8pm, jointly with the sta-
tion at Breslau. Happy that all was settled, the playwright went on a 
foreign trip, only to hear through the grapevine some four weeks later 
that his play had been rejected for political reasons. Ebermayer’s letter 
to the newspaper was a protest at the “grotesque” way in which a 
play—which had won the plaudits and support of the literary de-
partment for its educational and radiogenic merits and that was sup-
portive of the constitutional state—should be foiled by a lone 
National Socialist voice on the political board of review.  
The machinations behind the broadcasting of this play, whatever 
the truth of them, were caught up in the increasingly bitter battles 
playing out between the parties and in the press about the merits or 
otherwise of an increasing politicization of the airwaves, which was 
itself an echo of the increasingly bitter politics playing out between an 
increasingly confident nationalist right wing and a reinvigorated left. 
Parties at both extremes were still banished from the airwaves, de-
spite a gradual reinterpretation of the ”non-political” guidelines that 
allowed political opinions into the schedules, if tempered by the 
watchwords of ”parity” and ”balance” (Lacey, 1996, pp. 49–53). 
The script was eventually picked up by the newly adventurous 
Funk-Stunde in Berlin, although even there it was not unanimously 
welcomed (Jelavich, 2009, p. 118), and was duly broadcast at 8pm on 
September 25. The furor caused by the broadcast was immediate and 
widespread. The decision to present the events of the drama as if in 
real time played a large part in the scare, unleashing a wave of ru-
mours about the assassination of the current Foreign Minister, Julius 
Curtius, and the imminence of a right-wing coup. Curtius, a member 
of the rightist German People’s Party (DVP) had, co-incidentally, re-
cently been attending a European conference in Geneva which, to-
gether with the memory of Rathenau’s assassination still fresh in the 
collective memory, made the scenario all the more credible.  
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The broader political context also played its part in convincing the 
audience that what they were listening to was actuality rather than 
drama. Political militancy was intensifying as the economic Depres-
sion deepened. Indeed, just two weeks before the broadcast, a third of 
the electorate had voted for anti-establishment parties, with the Nazi 
Party—until recently a marginal group easily dismissed—having 
made significant gains. There had been growing tension in the streets 
of Berlin and elsewhere, and rumors of a fascist putsch were already 
rife.5 
The play was broadcast on the same day that Hitler made a wide-
ly reported, inflammatory speech when he appeared as a witness for 
the defence in Germany’s Supreme Court in Leipzig during a high-
profile case where three army officers were accused of treason for 
plotting a Nazi coup. While trying to make the case that theirs was an 
ideological, not a militaristic movement, and that they respected the 
rule of law, Hitler nevertheless declared that, ”when our movement 
wins its legal struggle […] November 1918 will find its retribution, 
and heads will also roll” (Hitler cited in Hett, 2008, p. 73). Some lis-
teners to the play that night apparently thought that the head of the 
Foreign Minister was the first such head to roll.  
Responses to the broadcast should also be situated within a 
broader controversy over the responsibilities and censorship of drama 
on the radio, the direction of the Berlin station in particular, and the 
on-going politicization of the radio system that Hans Bredow had 
been determined to keep strictly above the fractious politics of the pe-
riod. Various papers reported that the government had managed to 
delay the broadcast of the play until after the elections, but that it had 
not been able to prevent it altogether (RRG, Deutsche Tageszeitung, 
Börsen-Zeitung and the Berliner Illustrierte Nachtausgabe, Sept. 27; Ger-
mania and Der Reichsbote Sept. 30, 1930). Indeed, it seems that the re-
gional board of censorship had overturned the advice of the Minister 
of the Interior, Joseph Wirth, to reject the play outright (RRG, Frank-
furter Oder Zeitung, Sept. 28, 1930), who later expressed regret that the 
play had been broadcast in such a way (Mitteldeutsche Zeitung and Es-
sener Volkszeitung, Sept. 28, 1930; RRG, Rheinische Zeitung, Sept. 27). 
The right-wing press was variously astonished, dismayed and 
outraged that the Berlin station had managed to put on a play that 
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portrayed right-wingers as lawless assassins. They called for the gov-
ernment to take action to root out and remove those ”mindless” men 
responsible for such ”scandalous,” ”tasteless,” and ”incomprehensi-
ble” programming, programming that was in danger of sparking not 
only internal rumor-mongering and unrest but international conster-
nation, too. The story about the alarm in Berlin and the provinces was 
carried in the international press, including the New York Times 
(“Murder Play,” 1930, p. 22), the Manchester Guardian (“Wireless 
Causes a Scare,” 1930, p. 13), and European papers (RRG, Die 
Reichspost, Vienna; National Bruxellois, Sept. 27, 1930; Petit Journal, Par-
is; Prager Tageblatt, Prague). The Times of London reported, for exam-
ple, that newspaper offices and the Foreign Office had been 
”overwhelmed with telephonic inquiries, some of them from outside 
Germany’s frontiers” (“’Contretemps,’” 1930, p. 9).  
Most of the regional press in the country at large simply reported 
the play as “a bad joke” or a ”grotesque misunderstanding” (Allen-
steiner Zeitung, Sept. 27, 1930RRG; Rhein-Main Volkszeitung, Hannover-
scher Curier), although some played on the tastelessness and lack of 
tact in the capital (RRG, Münchener Neueste Nachrichten, Sept. 27, 
1930). The left-wing press in Berlin meanwhile generally applauded 
the contemporary relevance of the play’s subject matter, but some 
quarters still questioned whether the director had ”lost his senses” in 
choosing to start the play by mimicking an emergency announce-
ment, and that care had to be taken by those in charge of such a pow-
erful medium (RRG, Berliner Tageblatt, Sept. 27, 1930). The Welt am 
Montag (RRG, Sept. 27, 1930), a socialist paper, made the telling point 
that there had not been anything like as much outcry in the right-
wing press when Rathenau had been assassinated for real.  
Other press coverage concentrated on the artistic ambition of the 
play and admired the way the director had experimented with un-
conventional methods. The Berliner Börsencourier welcomed the way 
the play brought radio drama closer to the present and rejected con-
ventional techniques, and appreciated the director’s attempts to un-
derscore the drama of the situation with acoustic innovations. Tempo 
thought that the elegance of its direction, the surefootedness of the 
storyline and the passion of its argument, made it simply the best 
contemporary piece that had been heard on the radio in recent years. 
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Vorwärts was impressed by the way the responsible figure of the Min-
ister was contrasted with the ”shadowy figures of the uninhibited, 
immature but politicized youth” (RRG, Berliner Börsencourier, Tempo, 
and Vorwärts, Sept. 26, 1930).  
Several papers commented on the play’s realism. The BZ am Mit-
tag praised the play for having demonstrated a new standard for 
modern, topical radio art, and suggested that in blurring the distinc-
tion between life and art, it took the venerable traditions of realist 
theatre to new heights. Der Kleine Journal blamed the furor on the fact 
that the usual output of the drama department was so dull that most 
listeners just turned off when they heard the word, Hörspiel (radio-
play). In fact, most of those who had been taken in by the announce-
ment of the assassination, it suggested, would have been tuning in to 
wait for the news bulletin. That view was not shared by the Berliner 
Morgen-Zeitung, which said that with the sensationalist direction of 
this play the Funk-Stunde had taken realism too far (Berliner Morgen-
Zeitung, Sept. 27, 1930; Der Kleine Journal, Oct 3; RRG, BZ am Mittag, 
Sept. 26 and 29). 
Finally, other papers reflected on what the broadcast had to say 
about the power of radio and the vulnerability of audiences. The 
Magdeburger Generalanzeiger thought the play had performed an in-
valuable service in demonstrating the extraordinary power of the ra-
dio news service, and the woeful gullibility of some sections of the 
listening public (RRG, Magdeburger Generalanzeiger, Sept. 27, 1930). 
The Chemnitzer Neueste Nachrichten meanwhile playfully wondered if 
the sensation-hungry public would believe an announcement relayed 
from London that ”Lloyd George has vanished without trace” (RRG, 
Chemnitzer Neueste Nachrichten, Sept. 27, 1930). The 12 Uhr Blatt, how-
ever, ran a headline, ”Much ado about nothing,” suggesting it was 
only the ”weaker” members of the audience who had been affected 
and that this was a small price to pay for “lively, topical and activist 
radio.” The reason for all the hoohah, it claimed, was simply to whip 
up a political frenzy against Flesch (RRG, 12 Uhr Blatt, Sept. 26, 1930).  
Indeeed, one of the immediate consequences of the broadcast and 
the Interior Ministry’s intervention was to sharpen the sense of crisis 
that had been brewing around the direction of the capital’s radio sta-
tion over the last year. Although the appointment of Flesch as director 
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of the Berliner Funk-Stunde a year before had been widely welcomed 
by radio insiders and the liberal and leftist press (Leonhard, 1997, p. 
82), his appointment, and his policy of sponsoring avant-garde art 
and increasing the coverage of current affairs, had also sharpened the 
view of the right-wing that the Funk-Stunde was a hotbed of bolshe-
vists putting out Marxist propaganda.  
The Berliner Morgenpost echoed a view that had long been domi-
nant in Weimar radio, namely that politics did not belong on the air, 
especially at such a time of political tension (RRG, Berliner Morgenpost, 
Sept. 28, 1930). The Deutsche Tageszeitung went much further, arguing 
that the Berliner Funk-Stunde had for a long time been slowly “killing 
itself” with its taste for politics, but that this was the ultimate suicide 
attempt, inviting the “tendentious” playwright Ebermayer to strike 
the final blow. Its headline ran, “Die Funkstunde ist ermordet!” In the 
most bitter attack on the “red station,” the paper speculated that the 
supply of decent plays must be “devilishly thin.” They congratulated 
the Funk-Stunde on the awe-inspiring success of the directors in play-
ing with public opinion, challenging the nation and attacking the 
people. It was called a ”radio putsch” in which the station had relent-
lessly exploited the turbulent times for its leftist propaganda 
(Deutsche Zeitung, Sept. 27, 1930; RRG, Deutsche Tageszeitung, Sept. 
26). 
In more extreme quarters, the modernist radio experiments were 
decried as a Jewish pestilence. Ebermayer was described as both a 
”Systemdichter” (a System Poet) and a ”Judenfreund” (Friend of the 
Jews). Der Minister ist ermordet! and the surrounding uproar was 
seized on by his critics as evidence that Flesch was not up to the job of 
”cleansing” the Berlin station of its worst excesses although it was 
Edlef Köppen who came closest to being relieved of his post (RRG, 
Frankfurter Oder Zeitung and Neue Mannheimer Zeitung, Oct. 1, 1930).6 
With a particularly chilling turn of phrase, one paper looked forward 
to the time when the Nazis would be powerful enough for the Funk-
Stunde to be finally ”mucked out” [ausgemistet] (cited in Jelavich, 
2009, p. 119).  
Despite talk of their likely dismissal following the broadcast, 
Flesch, Köppen and Braun all survived at the Funk-Stunde until 1932, 
albeit weakened by the scandal, and increasingly compromised by the 
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worsening political situation. Their much-heralded radio adaptation 
of Döblin’s Berlin Alexanderplatz due for broadcast later that month, 
for example, was never aired, caught up in the post-election anxieties 
as well as the Minister affair (Jelavich, 2009, p. 119; Ryder, 2012, p. 36). 
Flesch eventually became the most prominent victim of the nationalist 
re-organization of German radio under the new Radio-Commissar of 
the Ministry of the Interior, Erich Scholz, dismissed because of ”cul-
tural-political considerations.” Flesch and Braun were later among a 
group of leading radio pioneers who were incarcerated and subjected 
to a show trial once the Nazis came to power (Leonhard, 1997, pp. 
333–334). Most of the new appointments made during the closing 
months of the Weimar Republic were chosen for their politics rather 
than their talents or experience in broadcasting. Flesch’s successor as 
station director, Richard Kolb, was at least a radio theorist—but also 
an enthusiastic propagandist for the Nazis. When the Nazis came to 
power in 1933 and were able to take complete control of the airwaves, 
Kolb and his colleagues, under the rubric of Goebbels’ new Ministry 
of Propaganda, were certainly all too aware of the potential of dra-
matic, emotional broadcasts to mobilize and intimidate the radio au-
dience. 
London’s Wireless Scare of 1926 
When The Times reported on Der Minister ist ermordet!, it reminded its 
readers that, ”the incident recalls a similar contretemps in London 
some time ago, when listeners were alarmed by a vivid description of 
a revolution said to have broken out in London” (“‘Contretemps,’” 
1930, p. 9). The scare had occurred in the wake of a short BBC 
production, Broadcasting from the Barricades, aired on January 15, 1926 
from Edinburgh which, tongue-in-cheek, feigned a breaking news 
report about a violent uprising in central London. The “burlesque” 
begins with its author and presenter, Father Ronald Knox (1888–
1957), in the guise of a donnish broadcaster with a pronounced lisp, 
concluding a lecture on eighteenth century literature. He then segues 
into a parody of the ponderous BBC announcing style, relaying news 
of an angry crowd (led by a Mr. Poppleberry of the “National 
Association for the Abolition of Theatre Queues”) apparently 
assembling in the capital:  
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The crowd in Trafalgar Square is now assuming threatening dimensions. 
Threatening dimensions are now being assumed by the crowd which has 
collected in Trafalgar Square to voice the grievances of the unemployed. . . . 
(“Father Knox’s Saturday,” 1926, p. 5) 
The broadcast then returns to apparently normal service, with a 
musical number, weather and cricket results, before returning to the 
now threatening mob which, over the course of the deadpan comic 
drama, replete with sound effects—still a rarity on the air in those 
days—destroys the Savoy Hotel, attacks the wildfowl in St. James’ 
Park, and lynches a fictional government Minister called Mr. 
Wutherspoon, before marching on Parliament and bringing Big Ben 
crashing to the ground. 
Just three years since public broadcasting debuted in the UK there 
were not yet any standardised conventions for relaying catastrophes 
as they unfolded; yet despite the sense of realism achieved by moving 
back and forth between regular programming and the increasingly 
urgent news bulletins, it still seems unlikely in retrospect—and in-
deed to many at the time—that anyone could have been taken in by 
such comic reporting: 
The Clock Tower, 320ft in height, has just fallen to the ground, together with 
the famous clock Big Ben, which used to strike the hours on a bell weighing 
nine tons. Greenwich time will be given this evening, not by Big Ben, but 
will be given from Edinburgh on Uncle Leslie’s repeating watch. Uncle 
Leslie’s repeating watch will be used for Greenwich time this evening 
instead of Big Ben, which has just fallen to the ground under the influence of 
trench mortars. (“Father Knox’s Saturday,” 1926, p. 5)7  
The rioters finally march on the BBC studios in Savoy Hill but, unlike 
the Martians who would later destroy the CBS building in War of the 
Worlds, they end up in the waiting room, reading copies of Radio 
Times.  
Despite all the textual clues that this was a fictional representa-
tion—not to mention the pre-broadcast warning—there were plentiful 
reports of listeners confused, concerned or outraged by the ”irrespon-
sible” broadcast. The story was widely repeated of a woman who had 
fainted and of city officials from Nottingham to Newcastle who were 
apparently ready to call in the troops (“That BBC Scare,” 1926, p. 2). 
The Dublin correspondent of The Times reported that, ”stories spread 
through the city like wildfire” and that ”many timid folk were genu-
inely startled by the news” (“Father Knox’s Wireless Talk,” 1926, p. 
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6). There were even reports of celebrations in Ireland as people be-
lieved that the House of Commons had been blown up, and the Irish 
government made diplomatic enquiries to establish the truth (Walker, 
2011 as cited in Wilkes, 2011). Back in London, the phone lines at Sa-
voy Hill had started ringing within 20 minutes of the broadcast, and 
so the news bulletin later that night tried to reassure its listeners, albe-
it in a somewhat exasperated tone: 
Some listeners who apparently only heard part of Father Knox’s talk at 7.40 
this evening did not realize the humorous innuendoes underlying his 
imaginary news items and have felt uneasy as to the fate of London, Big 
Ben, and other places mentioned in the talk. As a matter of fact, the 
preliminary announcement stated that the talk was a skit on broadcasting 
and the whole talk was, of course, a burlesque, and we hope that any 
listeners who did not realise it will accept our sincere apologies for any 
uneasiness caused. London is safe. Big Ben is still chiming, and all is well. 
(“Wild Tales ... ” 1926, p. 10)  
The Edinburgh producers were apparently rather buoyed by the 
proof of how realistic their sound effects had been, and one was quot-
ed as saying, “I think that we are entitled to regard the whole thing as 
a compliment to ourselves” (“London Is Safe,” 1926, p. 2). However, 
when the scale of the scare became evident, the BBC issued a more 
formal apology, expressing regret that any listeners had been “per-
turbed by this purely fantastic picture” (“Britain Is Alarmed . . . ” Jan 
18, 1926). In the end, despite the press excitement, the 249 complaints 
received by the BBC were far outnumbered by the number of positive 
letters received, and applications for receiver licenses showed a 
marked increase in the wake of the broadcast (Snoddy, 2005). Al-
though there were rumours that Knox had been blacklisted by Reith, 
his friend, Evelyn Waugh, maintained this was not the case, and that 
in fact within a few months Knox was on the air again, parodying a 
scientific talk, “illustrating the sounds, now made audible to the 
learned, of vegetables in pain” (Waugh, 2005, p. 290).  
Part of the explanation for the scale of the reaction has been at-
tributed to the fact that there was heavy snow in the country on the 
day of the broadcast, meaning that there was a delay in the morning 
papers, and that this kept rural listeners believing the capital was in 
flames. It might also explain why, by the time the press was ready to 
respond, the story was largely about the irresponsibility of the BBC (a 
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reaction motivated by the prevailing poor relations between the press 
and the radio), than about the putative panic itself. The Catholic pa-
per, The Tablet, was just one that took Father Knox to task for treating 
such a serious topic as a ”Red Revolution” so facetiously, writing that, 
”There are in England groups of hireling Communists who must have 
been enormously encouraged by the fact that many Britons were bad-
ly scared last Saturday” (cited in Waugh, 2005, p. 290). Indeed, the 
Russian Revolution was still fresh in the memory, as were reports of 
unrest in Germany and elsewhere. Moreover, it was broadcast only a 
few months before the crisis of the General Strike, at a time when 
class relations in the country were as strained as they’d ever been. It is 
worth noting that the vast majority of ”listeners-in” during this early 
period would have been the middle classes who had most to fear 
about news of a proletarian—almost alien—insurrection (Crook, 1999, 
p. 124). 
Evelyn Waugh (2005, p. 290), reflecting on the broadcast, main-
tained that it had had serious repercussions for revealing to politi-
cians ”the gullibility of simple people by this new apparatus,” and 
was one of many to suggest that Welles had known of Barricades, and 
had set out to imitate the effect. Certainly, the event had received fair-
ly prominent coverage in the United States. The day after the broad-
cast, the New York Times, for example, reported that: “Great 
excitement and fear were caused here [London] and in all parts of 
Great Britain and Ireland ... ” (“Britain Is Alarmed,” 1926, p. 3).  
Just as with the War of the Worlds episode twelve years later, lis-
teners were said to have been fooled by having tuned in after the 
warning that the news items were not to be taken seriously, together 
with a combination of rumor and newspaper coverage that height-
ened the effect. And, just as in the coverage of War of the Worlds, won-
der was expressed that anyone could have been so naïve as to have 
been taken in by it, or so dainty as to have been physically affected.8 
A week later, another article described how the skit saw:  
harrowed ladies in remote country districts, who […] in great consternation 
barricaded themselves behind their bedroom doors. One impressionable 
Sheriff in a northern county telephoned to the Mayoress of Newcastle to ask 
what the Lord Mayor and constabulary were doing to stave off the Red ruin. 
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The report went on to reflect that, ”It was a good story, and the 
newspapers were full of it.“ In a final flourish, it summed up the 
event in a way that manages to be patronizing not only about gullible 
listeners in general, but about women in particular and indeed the 
British altogether: “It was thoroughly representative of this stodgy 
old country and the dear old ladies who have abandoned knitting 
needles for wireless sets” (Marshall, 1926, p. E1).  
The scare had fewer repercussions for broadcasting policy than in 
the German case, although a few weeks later the Daily Mirror report-
ed that, ”another storm has arisen on the wireless waves.” Chastened 
by the recent experience, the BBC was apparently now standing firm 
on their right of censorship having discovered that, “the ear is evi-
dently even more sensitive than eye and ear combined. What can’t be 
seen may easily be believed. The imagination supplies what the eye 
does not behold.” The Mirror commented sardonically, that the BBC 
should then avoid all but ”unexceptional” items, in order to avoid 
shocking or confusing ”the evidently numerous people who have 
tender wireless nerves.“ It suggested, however, that ”bold sensation-
lovers” would ”object to having the mild pace set for them by inva-
lids,” and took the opportunity to underline the need for an alterna-
tive broadcaster to the BBC, whose monopoly contract was up for 
renewal later that year (“Broadcast Nerves,” 1926, p. 7).  
The Barricades incident was also reported in the German press. 
Where the New York Times had thought the English particularly gulli-
ble, Der deutsche Rundfunk, rather presciently asked, ”Would not 
many people in Germany, where we actually have experienced such 
events, have been duped by such a ‘burlesque’?” (Bußmann, 1926, cit-
ed in Jelavich, 2009, p. 522). By the time of the War of the Worlds panic, 
Hitler was in power at the head of a regime that believed unreserved-
ly in the power of radio propaganda; nevertheless he used news of 
the American panic to claim the immunity of the German people to 
such scaremongering, saying the Volk, “shall not succumb to a fear of 
bombs, falling—let us say—from either Mars or the moon” (Hitler 
speech of Nov. 8, 1938 as cited in Goodman, 2011, p. 267). 
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Conclusion 
Neither Broadcasting from the Barricades nor The Minister’s Been 
Murdered! have acquired the iconic status of the War of the Worlds 
scare. Any number of reasons might be mooted for that—the context 
and timing of the broadcast, the size of the available audience and the 
scale and public dimension of the reactions, the celebrity of 
its authors, the influence of the subsequent scholarly attention ab-
sorbed by a radio play about radio that seemed to reveal so much 
about broadcasting and its audiences. Indeed, the reaction to the War 
of the Worlds broadcast is very often told as a media-centric story. It 
was, of course, a drama that played self-reflexively on the broadcast 
construction of reality and to that extent it shared something with 
both of the earlier examples that had also appropriated the represen-
tation of breaking news. It also caused fear among those listeners who 
were not tuned in or attuned to the framing devices both in print and 
on air that announced these “news bulletins” as part of a drama.  
All the examples demonstrate something about the degree of au-
thority and trust that had remarkably quickly been established by the 
broadcasters, not least evidenced in the subsequent public debates 
about whether these dramas had taken the trust of their audiences in 
vain—or whether they had done the public a service in puncturing 
people’s blind faith in the broadcast word. Certainly, too, the extent of 
the press coverage and commentary is notable in all three cases, and 
no doubt served to magnify the meaningfulness of these events at the 
time and in retrospect; although it is also the case that the impact of 
all three broadcasts was heightened, circulated and tested by word of 
mouth either in the home, on the streets, or on the telephone.9 More-
over, inasmuch as these are media-centric events, they are also very 
much about press-radio relations at a time when the new medium of 
radio was threatening to usurp the newspaper as the primary source 
of topical and authoritative information.  
The debates surrounding the more extreme reactions reported in 
the wake of these broadcasts in all three cases are also incarnations, of 
course, of on-going debates about the gullibility, nervousness and in-
attention of mass audiences. Primarily, these judgments about the 
audience were used as markers of distinction, revealing at least as 
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much about the critics as about the listeners. But it is interesting to 
note how the transnational coverage of these “panicked” audiences 
reveal national as well as gendered and class stereotypes in this re-
gard. Indeed, the international coverage of all three broadcasts is in-
teresting in its own right, reinforcing the sense that these were highly 
unusual events and that the prevailing assumption was actually that 
listeners of whatever nationality, political persuasion or educational 
status very rarely ”misunderstood” broadcast address. Moreover, the 
way in which public discourse surrounding each new event referred 
back at some point to the one before, even across national borders, 
indicates how these events took on a mythical status that outlived and 
exceeded any immediate effect they might have had. While coverage 
and commentary at the time was briefly intense in all cases, their last-
ing effect was to have become touchstones in the on-going debates 
about the relative power and responsibilities of the media and their 
publics. 
All three broadcasts also play with the complex interchange be-
tween fact and fiction, artifice and reality, reporting and imagination, 
crisis and composure. They resonated because they all, in their differ-
ent ways, dealt with disasters that were not only reported in the con-
temporary broadcasting vernacular of unfolding catastrophes, but 
seemed plausible within the listeners’ wider experience of events and 
discourses unfolding in the public sphere, be they insurrections, as-
sassinations or threats of invasion.  
The differences between the three incidents, however, are also in-
structive. They are, in part, to be explained by the different status that 
radio itself had acquired over the twelve years between 1926, when 
broadcasting genres were still in flux, through 1930 when in Germa-
ny, as elsewhere, there was a new focus on using the radio for live 
coverage of unfolding events, to 1938 by which time radio news in 
America had achieved a degree of familiarity and authority for large 
sections of the population. The Barricades skit, never intended as a se-
rious critique of the broadcast form, seems not to have caused any 
great national soul-searching about the intelligence or otherwise of 
the British people; nor did it inspire any great internal policy discus-
sions within the BBC. Reith was famously ill disposed to audience re-
search, and it seems as if he was just as unimpressed with demands to 
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change company policy in the wake of this untoward and unexpected 
audience reaction. While opinions differ on whether the Mercury 
Theater production deliberately set out to cause a stir, there was clear-
ly some anticipation of controversy in advance of the Berlin broad-
cast, but the risk was taken deliberately by a station management 
committed to artistic experimentation and faith, against the odds, in 
the tolerance of the listening public. In this respect, it is noteworthy 
that the European examples were broadcast on public service stations 
that had a near monopoly of listeners unlike the Mercury Theater of 
the Air, which was only ever intended as minority radio—generally 
achieving less than 4% of the available audience in 1938 (the comedy 
on rival network NBC, being ten times as popular) (Goodman, 2011, 
p. 258).  
The War of the Worlds shared a sense of the fantastical with the 
Barricades broadcast, but shared the aspiration to ”quality” drama 
with Ebermayer’s play. The latter is distinguished by its being based 
on recent historical events with its intention more to provide a critical 
dramatization and commentary on the prevailing political situation 
than a parody or reflection on the medium of communication. The 
commentaries on the response to the German broadcast were also de-
fined at least as much by the stark political divisions as by the cultural 
divide. Where the prolific debate in America in 1938 centred, broadly 
speaking, on the varieties of self-government required of listeners to 
mitigate against media manipulation as a way of off-setting the pro-
spect of more restrictive regulation of the airwaves or constraints on 
the constitutional freedoms of speech, the debate in Germany cen-
tered much more on the shortcomings of the broadcasters, and the 
wireless scare of 1930 became another small stepping stone on the 
path to the centralization and political control of the airwaves. 
Notes 
1 The article was entitled, “Great Mischief and Grotesque Tastelessness at the 
Berlin Radio Station.” The German newspaper references throughout are taken 
primarily from the Reichsrundfunkgesellschaft (RRG) clipping file, held at the 
Bundesarchiv (BArch), file R78/836, pp. 157-166. 
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2 The BBC has a short soundclip of the broadcast available as part of its 90 X 90 
series; a collection of ninety 90-second clips from spanning 90 years of BBC 
history. The Riot that Never Was is available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
programmes/p010sxc0.  
3 There are only the scantest references to Der Minister in the standard histories of 
German radio (Bausch, 1956; Dussell, 2004; Leonhard, 1997; Lerg, 1970), or even, 
with the exception of Jelavich (2009, pp. 117–119), in the more specialized 
literature on German radio plays (Bösch and Borutta, 2005, p. 25; Hagelüken, 
2008, p. 38, n. 13; Hörburger, 1977, p. 393; Leonhard, 2001, p. 1473; Schätzlein, 
2001, p. 184; Schwitzke, 1963, pp. 41 and 107). For discussions of the BBC play, 
see Crook (1999, pp. 123–124) and Walker (2011, p. 55).  
4 See also, RRG, Berliner Illustrierte Nachtausgabe, Jun. 6, Deutsche Tageszeitung, 
Aug. 9, and Ulmer Tageblatt, Aug. 11, 1931.  
5 The Communist paper, Die Welt am Abend, for example, published a story about 
how the Americans were implicated in a conspiracy with Chancellor Brüning 
and the German bankers to institute a Nazi coup d’état. Though there was plenty 
of violence on the streets, by this time Hitler was clear that he did not want a 
coup, but was confident he could manipulate the existing system to come to 
power (Burke, 1994, pp. 81–3). 
6 It was in 1930, incidentally, that Köppen’s celebrated autobiographical anti-war 
novel, Heeresbericht, was published, written in the style of an acoustic montage 
(Schafnitzel, 2003). 
7 Uncle Leslie was one of the Children’s Hour presenters in Edinburgh. 
8 This play is cited as a previous example of a panic broadcast in Cantril’s study, 
([1940]2009), p. xxvii. 
9 See Hayes and Battles (2011) for a detailed of discussion of the role of social and 
technological networks in the War of the Worlds response, even during a period of 
centralized media. 
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